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Note
Balancing Employer and Employee Interests in Social Media Disputes
Tara R .
Flomenhoft*
I.

Introduction

There is an emerging and unpredictable relationship today between social media and employment. For
example, on a snowy New Years Eve in 2011, a truck driver was traveling cross- country and was fired due to
his social media use.1 While en route to his drop-off, he discovered the road was closed due to the snowy
conditions and therefore needed to contact the on-call dispatcher to inform her that he would be late for his
delivery.2 He was unable to reach the dispatcher because the phone system had been im properly set up for
the holiday.3 The driver was especially frustrated with the unanswered calls because he was also supposed to
assist and advise new drivers, and with the improperly set up phone system, he was unable to do so.4
The next morning while still waiting to complete his delivery, he posted to his personal Facebook
page about his frustration with the situation.5 A few days later, the Operation’s Manager6 responded to his
Facebook post about the closed roads and unavailable on-call dispatcher.7 The driver e x p l a i n e d h e w a s
c o n c e r n e d that he could lose his job over the original Facebook post.8 The Operation’s Manager assured
him not to worry about it.9

1 A d v i c e M e m o r a n d u m , B u e l Inc., No. 11-CA-22936, 2011 WL 3793671, at *1 (Jul. 28, 2011).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at *2.
5 Id.
6 Lafe E. Solomon, Second Report, N A T ’ L L A B O R R E L A T I O N S B D . (Jan. 24, 2012),
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/fact-sheets/nlrb-and-social-media (follow “second report” hyperlink).
7 Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at *1.
8 Id.
9 Id.
*

J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2016. I would like to thank Professor Mary Ziegler
for suggesting this topic and her guidance during the writing process.

	
   	
   	
  

1

About a week later, upon return to his company’s facility, the driver learned that he would be stripped
of his leadership status because of his alleged unprofessionalism on Facebook.11 The driver was frustrated and
stunned but accepted his discipline; however, this was not the only discipline he would receive.12 When he
returned to the facilities again a few weeks later, none of the office personnel would speak to him. 13 He
concluded all he could do was resign since he was unable to receive any of his work assignments from the
company. 14 He then filed a claim with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleging he was forced to
resign, but the Board upheld the employer’s actions.15
For other employees, the law on social media and employment has been much more
forgiving. For instance, a BMW salesman was not disciplined for his Facebook posts that were much more
derogatory towards his employer.16 The dealership was holding one of its largest s a l e s events of the year,
and the salesman w a s hoping to make a very large commission.17 A few days prior to the event, the
salesman along with a couple of the other sales people, voiced their disproval over the food choice for the
event.18 Specifically at issue was a hot dog stand, because they claimed that other dealerships that put on
similar events would serve a higher quality food choice.19 The employer disagreed and used the hot dog stand
at the event.20

10 Solomon, Second Report, supra note 6.
11 Advice Memorandum, supra note 1 at *2.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at *2-3; Solomon, Second Report, supra note 6.
16 Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. N o . 164 (2012).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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On the day of the event, the hot dog stand was present which upset the salesman.21 He photographed
the food at the event which he then shared to his Facebook page under an album titled, “BMW 2011 5 Series
Soiree.”22 He wrote various sarcastic captions criticizing his employers’ food choices, including one photo
which featured a coworker holding a bottle of water and read, “No, that is not champagne or wine, it’s an 8 oz.
water. Pop or soda would be out of the question. In this photo, [my coworker is] . . . coveting the rare vintages
of water that were available for our guests.”23 The salesman also shared multiple photos of an accident at his
employer’s other dealership, where a young boy had driven a model vehicle into a nearby pond with a salesman
sitting in the passenger seat, which had taken place a few weeks earlier.24
The salesman’s Facebook posts included both the hot dog photos and the accident photos.25 The
salesman was then fired for his Facebook activity.26 The employer explained he was fired mainly due to the
car accident photos, not the hot dog photos.27 The salesman filed a claim with the NLRB, a n d the NLRB
agreed that the photos of the hot dog stand were protected, but that the accident photos were not, which made
his firing lawful.28
The truck driver and BMW salesman have both confronted a legal problem that plays an
increasingly important part in employment law. How should the law balance the competing concerns of
employers and employees in the context of social media? And, how should the law strike a balance between
employees’ legitimate interests in privacy and freedom of expression with employers’ business needs?
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25
26
27
28
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The intersection between social media and the workplace is undeniable. As of January
2014, seventy-four percent of online adults use social media sites.29 Moreover, the most popular site is
Facebook, and at least sixty-three percent of Facebook users sign on daily, and forty percent do so multiple
times each day.30 Users also interact with a variety of other social media platforms on a daily basis, including
Instagram,31 Twitter, and Linkedin.32 Furthermore, many social media users are “friends” with their
coworkers, and twenty-one percent are even “friends” with their supervisors.33 Therefore, this overlap
between social media and the workplace is undeniable.
Since most employees work in the private sector, federal and state constitutional protections
related to privacy or free speech rarely apply to employees’ social media use. Then, with only a handful of
employees covered by either contractual protections or state law provisions, the law on social media and
employment has emerged largely under the National

29 Social Networking Factsheet, P E W R E S E A R C H C T R . ( Dec. 27, 2013),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact- sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/. This data included adults from ages
18 to over 65. Id.
30 Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, Frequency of Social Media Use, P E W R E S E A R C H C T R . ( D e c .
2 0 , 2 0 1 3 ) http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/12/30/frequency-of-social-media-use/.
31 Instagram is a social media site, which is used mainly through the downloadable free app, and it allows
users to share photos and videos with their families and friends. I N S T A G R A M , http://instagram.com (last
visited June 30, 2016).
32 Duggan & Smith, supra note 30. The numbers a s s o c i a t e d with these other social media sites dwindle in
comparison to Facebook, but are still significant to show the constant interaction with social media today. Id.
33 Keith Hampton et al., Part 3: Social Networking Sites and Our Lives, P E W R E S E A R C H C T R . (June 16,
2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/06/16/social-networking-sites-and-our-lives/. (finding that the average
Facebook user has 229 “friends” which includes family, friends, coworkers, and other acquaintances, and that
out of those 229 “friends” usually 10% are usually coworkers); see Lillian Cunningham, Should You Friend
Your Boss on Facebook?, W A S H . P O S T (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/onleadership/should-you-friend- your-boss-on-facebook/2012/10/25/6a8d5bba-1dff-11e2-ba313083ca97c314_story.html; Emily Protalinski, 21% Are Facebook Friends with Their Boss, ZD NET (Feb. 14, 2012,
3:33 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/21-are-facebook-friends-with-their-boss/ (showing a survey conducted by
the Russell Herder marketing group which found that not only are 21% of social media users “friends” with
their superiors, but that 46% initiated the “friend request” themselves).
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Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which is overseen by the NLRB.34 The NLRA typically regulates the rights of
most private sector employers and employees by encouraging collective bargaining, as well as by decreasing
harmful labor and management practices.35 Consequently, the intersection between social media and the
workplace rightfully falls under the hand of the NLRB. The outcomes produced under the NLRB’s direction in
regards to social media disputes have at times been favorable, but still very unpredictable.
The NLRB’s standards fail to strike a proper balance between the
interests of employers and employees. The NLRB undervalues and disregards employers’ interests in
discipline and control over the day-to day operations of the business. Moreover, the NLRB’s standards are so
vague and inconsistently applied that neither employers nor employees have adequate notice of when social
media use gains protection. To address these
shortcomings, this Note proposes a new bright line distinction designed to better account for the
interests of both employers and employees, and to also set a clear line for when social media use in the
workplace can give rise to discipline.
Thus, this Note will provide guidance for both employers and employees that the NLRB has lacked. It
will explain why the NLRB has applied Section 7 rights to this developing area of the law in Part II. In Part III,
this Note will examine the traditional standards that the NLRB applies to Section 7 rights, and then it will
examine the reports and Board decisions on social media disputes. Furthermore, in Part IV.A, this Note will
critique the NLRB’s approach to social media disputes and argue that they lack predictability. Part IV.B will
outline the interests of both employers and employees in social media expression that
the NLRB ignores in its decisions, and in Part IV.C, this N ote w ill propose a standard that balances
those interests more fairly. Finally, Part V will conclude.

34 The NLRB and Social Media, N A T ’ L L A B O R R E L A T I O N S B D . , https://www.nlrb.gov/newsoutreach/fact-sheets/nlrb-and-social-media (last visited June 29, 2016).
35 Id.
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II.

Why Does the NLRB Regulate Social Media, What is the NLRB, and What Does
It Use to Regulate This Area of the Law?

Since 2010, the NLRB h a s regulated the intersection of employment law and social media.36
Because most employees are employed privately rather than publicly, they do not enjoy t h e First or
Fourteenth Amendment protections that may otherwise cover social media disputes.37 Moreover, very few
states provide any robust privacy protection
for private sector employees, which would at least add an additional layer of protection for social
media expression.38 Furthermore, i n s t e a d o f granting broad protections for employee privacy into
their contracts, employers attempt to prescribe “social media policies” into their employee handbooks,
which t r y t o constrict employees’ social media use.39 Therefore, this leaves the NLRB to regulate this
area of the law since all other areas are essentially unavailable.
A. The NLRB
The NLRB is a federal agency that protects the rights of private sector employees to join together to
improve their wages and working conditions.40 It protects private
36 The NLRB and Social Media, supra note 34.
37 U.S. C O N S T . amend. I, XIV
38 See Catherine Crane, Social Networking V. the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: A Potential Defense
Employees Fried for Facebooking, Terminated for Twittering, Booted for Blogging, and Sacked for Social
Networking, 89 W ASH . U. L. R EV . 639, 649-54 (2012) (describing that private sector employees are not
provided the same protections as public sector employees in terms of privacy, and any attempts to pursue
discrimination and privacy claims a r e usually unsuccessful); Stephen D. Lichtenstein & Jonathan J. Darrow,
Employment Termination for Employee Blogging: Number One Tech Trend for 2005 and Beyond, or a
Recipe for Getting Dooced?, 2006
UCLA J.L. & T ECH . 4, 26 (2006) (showing that in 2006, only three states recognized that private
sector employees had any right to privacy in the workplace).
39 See generally Christine Neylon O’Brien, The Top Ten NLRB Cases on Facebook Firings and Employer
Social Media Policies, 92 O R . L. R EV . 337 (2013) (providing an overview of the most current cases involving
employers who attempted to include social media policies in their employee handbooks).
40 Rights We Protect, N A T ’ L L A B O R R E L A T I O N S B D . , http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect (last
visited June 29, 2016). The NLRA does not protect the rights of government employees. Frequently Asked
Questions – NLRB, N A T ’ L L A B O R R E L A T I O N S B D . , http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb#t38n3182
(follow “Which employees are protected under the NLRA?” hyperlink) (last visited June 29, 2016).
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employees’ rights whether they are in a union or not.41 It protects these rights via the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).42 The NLRA names this right for employees to join together and discuss job-related
problems, “protected concerted activity,” which was codified into the original act in 1935.43 In addition to
typical disputes over wages, hours, and other unfair working conditions, the NLRB also addresses issues arising
over an employee’s right to picket and strike, all of which are generally described as “concerted activity.”44
Today, the NLRB has extended its traditional protection of these types of work-related conversations to include
when t h e y a r e conducted on social media.45
In 2010, the NLRB began receiving claims in its regional offices from employees asserting that they
were unlawfully disciplined due to a social media posting or that the employer’s social media policy was
unlawful.46 Its regional offices then began issuing decisions later in 2010.47 Therefore, in an attempt to ensure
“consistent enforcement actions,” and also in response to employers requesting guidance in this developing
area of the law, the NLRB’s Acting General Counsel released three memorandums to detail and clarify the
results in several social media regional decisions from 2011-2012.48 Further, in late September of 2012, the
NLRB began issuing official Board decisions in order to establish precedent.49 Throughout these regional
decisions, memorandums, and Board decisions, the NLRB made it clear that “protected concerted activity”
covered this area of the law.50
41 Rights We Protect, supra note 40.
42 Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).
43Protected Concerted Activity, N A T ’ L L A B O R R E L A T I O N S B D . , http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/protected-concerted-activity (last visited June 29, 2016); Rights We Protect, supra note 40.
44 29 U.S.C. § 151; Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 40 (follow “Is it legal to strike or
picket an employer?” hyperlink).
45 The NLRB and Social Media, supra note 34.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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B. “Protected Concerted Activity” Under the NLRA
The NLRA describes concerted activity under Section 7.51 Section 7 explains that “Employees . . .
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . and
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.”52 Section 7 is enforced by section 8(a)(1) which states “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 157 of
this title [Section 7 of the NLRA].”53
Section 7 rights typically include at least two employees acting together to improve wages or working
conditions, but the action of a single employee may be covered when he or she is working on behalf of others
or involves other coworkers before acting.54 This employee or group of employees must be acting to
improve pay, hours, workload, or some other type of working condition.55 Some examples would include:
employees discussing safety measures together, signing a petition to improve working conditions, or an
employer penalizing an employee for joining a union.56 Therefore, the NLRB intervenes to restore what has
been unlawfully taken away from employees if they are fired, suspended, or disciplined for taking concerted
action.57 However, an employee or group of employees will not be covered by Section 7 when they are only
making a “personal gripe,” meaning complaining only about his or her job situation or airing grievances
about his or her employer,
51 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
52 Id.
53 Id. at §§157 -158.
54 Protected Concerted Activity, supra note 43.
55 Id.
56 Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/employerunion-rights-and-obligations (Nov. 16, 2014); see also Protected Concerted Activity, supra
note 43 (providing an interactive map on the NLRB’s website which includes a variety of cases where
protected concerted activity was found).
57 Protected Concerted Activity, supra note 43.
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coworkers, or customers.58 Additionally, an employee loses protection under Section 7 if they take action for
workplace improvement that is malicious or reckless. For instance, deliberately sabotaging or threatening
violence, spreading lies about a product or the company, or revealing trade secrets may cause the employee to
lose Section 7 protection.59
Section 7 rights have now been extended to include the social media realm when employees share
information about the workplace on their personal social media pages.60 Therefore, the questions is: what is
“concerted activity” in the social media context in comparison to what has typically been defined as Section 7
rights? Part III.A will discuss the traditional standards the NLRB has applied to determine whether an action
is considered “concerted activity,” and then Part III.B and III.C will show these traditional standards applied
and adapted to the social media context.
III.

Defining Concerted Activity: The State of the Law

The NLRB has several traditional standards for determining whether an action is concerted, which
will be explained in Part A of this section. Part B will then examine the adapted standards that the NLRB set
out in the three memorandums from
2011-2012. Finally, Part C will examine the notable Board decisions that examined and applied the traditional
standards to social media cases, which began in September 2012.
A. The Traditional Standards
The NLRB, along with appellate courts and the Supreme Court, have interpreted the meaning of
“concerted activity” since 1935 when the NLRA was codified.61 Over time, the meanings have changed
and expanded, yet many of the traditional interpretations still
58
59
60
61
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remain. The following section will explain the traditional standards that the NLRB has described and
applied for “concerted activity” under the NLRA.
1. A Speaker and a Listener
In 1951, the NLRB explained that for an action to be concerted all that is needed is a “speaker and a
listener.”62 But, it has been noted for an action to be concerted it does not require an employee to actually
enlist the support of others.63 Instead, concerted activity may just be an employee’s attempt to incite
coworkers into group action for work related interests even if the attempt ultimately fails.64 This is why there
must only be a “speaker and a listener.” This standard is still referred to and has remained an important
definitional
component to determine whether an action is concerted.65
2. Meyers I and Meyers II: An Objective Standard
In 1984, in Meyers Industries, Inc., the NLRB stated it would determine whether an action was
concerted under an “objective” standard.66 Known c o m m o n l y as Meyers I, it explained for an action to be
concerted an employee must “be engaged in with or on the
authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself”.67
Yet, in Prill v. NLRB, which was subsequently decided by the D.C. Circuit in 1985, the court
explained that the NLRB needed to reconsider its standard of concerted activity promulgated in Meyers I,
specifically in terms of scope.68 The D.C. Circuit claimed that the NLRB’s standard d e c l a r e d in Meyers I
was too narrow and in conflict with the NLRB’s previous

62 Root-Carlin, Inc. 92 N.L.R.B. 1313, 1314 (1951).
63 NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681, 684 (10th Cir. 1977).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1314; Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of “Concert”
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 315-16 (1981); Lauren K. Neal, The Virtual
Water Cooler and the NLRB: Concerted Activity in the Age of Facebook, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715, 1750 (2012).
66 Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 496 (1984).
67 Id. at 497.
68 Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 953, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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decisions.69 The D.C. Circuit explained that the standard from Meyers I appeared to require authorization by
a group of employees in order for an individual employee to come forward with a complaint, rather than
protecting, as it traditionally had, an individual employee attempting to induce action independently.70
Therefore in Meyers Industries, Inc., which is commonly referred to as Meyers II, the NLRB
reaffirmed its standard of concerted action from Meyers I and clarified it was not intended to be so narrow.71
The NLRB explained that the standard from Meyers I was not meant to be read so broad as to be redundant,
but instead that it was specifically expansive enough to include individual activity connected to collective
activity.72 It also highlighted and reaffirmed that concerted activity requires only a “speaker and a
listener.”73 Therefore, Meyers II is essentially only a clarification of Meyers I, but the definition of concerted
activity is more often recognized from Meyers II.74
3. Limitations on Protection under Section 7: Atlantic Steel and the Jefferson Standard
The NLRB has also limited its protection of concerted activity granted under Meyers II in both
Atlantic Steel, Co. and NLRB v. Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard).75 In Atlantic Steel, which was decided in
1979, the employee had a history of inappropriate behavior at work and was eventually discharged for calling
his superior a profanity.76 The employee tried to claim he was engaged in protected concerted action, but the
NLRB disagreed.77 It explained that even
when an employee is acting concerted, the protection may be lost if any behavior is deemed
69 Id. at 954.
70 Id. at 954-56.
71 Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 882 (1986); see also Neal, supra note 65, at 1719-21 (2012)
(discussing the adoption of the NLRB’s definition of concerted activity from Meyers I and Meyers II in more
detail).
72 Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. at 885.
73 Id. at 887.
74 Id. at 882; Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. at 497; Neal, supra note 65, at 1719.
75 NLRB v. Local 1229, Int’l Bhd. Elec. of Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1953); Meyers Indus., Inc., 281
N.L.R.B. at 882, 887; Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979).
76 Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. at 814-15.
77 Id. at 816-17.
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“opprobrious.”78 Opprobrious statements are usually obscene and profane and made in a setting in which
such conduct is not normally tolerated.79 However, if these types of statements are made during an organizing
effort, they may be deemed protected.80 Therefore, in Atlantic Steel, the NLRB i n t r o d u c e d a b a l a n c i n g
t e s t for determining whether an employee had acted opprobriously.81 These factors are as follows: “the place
of the discussion; the subject matter of the discussion; the nature of the employee’s outburst; and whether the
outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice.”82 Thus, by considering all of the
employee’s actions in Atlantic Steel and balancing them against these factors, the conduct was opprobrious.83
The NLRB also later noted that usually the Atlantic Steel standard is applied to a “public outburst,” rather than
an action made in privacy.84
The NLRB also limited the protection of Section 7 with the Jefferson Standard in 1953.85
The Jefferson Standard emphasized that concerted action does not include when an employee is deliberately
acting disloyal.86 The Jefferson Standard explained that unprotected behavior was when an employee makes
“sharp, public, disparaging attack[s] upon the quality of the company’s product and business policies, in a
manner reasonably calculated to harm the company’s reputation and reduce its income.”87 However, the
Jefferson Standard is limited in its application; it is only applicable to an issue related to an ongoing labor
dispute, and the attack on the employer must be “so disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue” in

78 Id.
79 Id. at 819.
80 Id. at 816.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 816-17.
84 Lafe E. Solomon, First Report, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD. (Aug. 1 8, 2011), https://www.nlrb.gov/newsoutreach/fact-sheets/nlrb-and-social-media (follow “first report” hyperlink).
85 NLRB v. Local 1229, Int’l Bhd. Elec. of Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 478 (1953).
86 Id. at 479-80.
87 Id. at 471.
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order to lose Section 7 protection.88 Finally, the Jefferson Standard’s analysis focuses mainly on the
effects an attack has on third parties.89
4. The Chilling Effect: Lafayette Park and Lutheran Heritage
Unlike the other traditional standards stated above, the final traditional standard actually specifically
addresses employers, instead of employees.90 The NLRB has stated an employer cannot enforce a rule that
“reasonably tend[s] to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.”91 In order to determine
whether a rule does chill an employee’s rights, the NLRB explained it conducts a two-step analysis. 92 The
first step is to determine whether a rule “explicitly restricts Section 7 activities” and if so, it is unlawful.93
Second, if the rule is not explicit, then the NLRB determines whether: “the employees would reasonably
construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity, the rule was promulgated in response to union activity,
or the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.”94 If the employer’s rule is found to
prohibit or restrict any of those stated activities, then the rule will be considered unlawful because it chills
employees’ rights.95 This standard usually applies to rules in employers’ handbooks.96
The following section will describe these traditional standards applied and adapted to
the early social media disputes from 2011-2012.

88 Am. Golf Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1240 (2000); see also Solomon, First Report, supra note 84
(discussing the Jefferson Standard in the social media context).
89 Am. Golf Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. at 1240.
90 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998).
91 Id.
92 Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B 646, 646-47 (2004); see Solomon, First
Report, supra note 84.
93 Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B, at 646.
94 Id. at 647.
95 Id. at 646-47.
96 Neal, supra note 65, at 1753.
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B. The Traditional Standards Applied and Modified for Social Media Disputes: The
Standards from the Memorandums
In the NLRB’s Second Report, it recognized there are “inherent differences” between the situations
where the traditional standards have typically applied and those same situations taking place over social
media.97 These differences included the fact that when an employee is discussing labor issues, the
conversation takes place at the workplace where, with social media, the same conversation may be discussed
from the privacy of the home and essentially anywhere while not on the job.98 Moreover, when the
conversation is over social media, usually other third parties are exposed to it, and therefore that differs from
a conversation in the workplace where ordinarily only other employees are exposed.99 Finally, w i t h t h e
t r a d i t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s , it is easier to understand when a work place discussion is meant to enlist third
party support, however this application is less clear when the discussion is made over social media, when it could
seem more similar to a conversation simply overheard.100 The NLRB had to adapt the traditional standards
for concerted action to take into consideration the differences that do exist with social media. Those modified
standards follow.
1. The Modified Atlantic Steel Standard: Combining the Atlantic Steel and Jefferson
Standards to Better Reflect the Impact on Third Parties on a Social Media Platform
Using the traditional standards typical of labor disputes, the NLRB’ s Second Report claimed to
utilize a modified Atlantic Steel standard that incorporated parts of the Jefferson Standard to create a more
suitable framework applicable to social media disputes.101
The NLRB explained that under the Atlantic Steel standard, it usually only assessed whether an employee’s
outburst was a “disruption to [the] workplace” and did not ordinarily consider the “disparaging impact of
comments” made on third parties, which is something that the Jefferson Standard usually evaluated.102
Therefore, the NLRB explained that when
97 Solomon, Second Report, supra note 6, at 25.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 24-25.
100 Id. at 24.
101 Id. at 24-45.
102 Id.
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analyzing an “outburst” on social media, it would “borrow” from the Jefferson Standard i n o r d e r to account
f o r the effects that social media postings have on third parties.103 The NLRB noted that by borrowing some
of the Jefferson Standard, the analysis of a social media outburst would more “closely follow the spirit of the
Board’s jurisprudence regarding the protection afforded to employee speech”.104
2. Modifying Prongs of the Atlantic Steel Standard
In addition, the Board has not only combined the Atlantic Steel and Jefferson Standard, but it has also
recognized that certain prongs of Atlantic Steel must be modified when applied to social media disputes.105
The NLRB noted in its Second Report that the “location” and “nature of the outburst” prongs of Atlantic Steel
must instead reflect the “inherent differences between a Facebook conversation and a workplace outburst.”106
Thus, the NLRB seemed to realize the impact outbursts might have on third parties when
shared on social media.107
Therefore, the NLRB adapted the “location” prong of Atlantic Steel to depend on whether the social
media posting occurred during work place hours.108 The “nature of the outburst” prong of Atlantic Steel was
also modified to include whether the posting was “so disruptive of the workplace discipline as to weigh in
favor of losing protection.”109 The NLRB decided it was best

103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 25.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See Christine Neylon O’Brien, The First Facebook Firing Case Under Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act: Exploring the Limits of Labor Law Protection for Concerted Communication on Social Media,
45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 48 (2011) (discussing the first application of Atlantic Steel to social media); see
also Lafe E. Solomon, First Report, supra note 84, (discussing the application of the standard for the first
time, but identifies the case anonymously); Solomon, Second Report, supra note 6, at 25.
109 Solomon, Second Report, supra note 6, at 25.
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to merge these factors to better account for the impact that social media postings about the
workplace could have on third parties.110
However, aside from these memorandums, the NLRB also began releasing Board decisions in late
2012 that only applied the traditional standards to social media disputes. The following section will
explain the most notable decisions.
C. Notable Board Decisions Describing the Law Applied to Social Media Disputes
1. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc.
Karl Knauz Motors is the first decision the Board issued on a social media dispute. 111
Karl Knauz Motors is also one of the cases discussed in Part I of this Note where the BMW salesman
shared photos of the hot dog stand to his personal social media page.112
The NLRB held that the photos of the hot dog stand were concerted, but the photos of the accident at
the employer’s adjacent dealership were not.113 It reasoned that the photos of the hot dog stand were concerted
under Meyers II, because they were an outgrowth of the salesman’s previous conversations with the other
salespeople over the employer’s food choice for the event.114 It further explained that because the quality of
food could have an effect on the salesman’s compensation,115 it was concerted.116
The NLRB also explained that admittedly this was not an “obvious” situation of
concerted activity, but since it was “possible” the hot dog stand could have affected the sales people’s
compensation, though still not “likely,” it was concerted activity.117 It also found that the mocking tone used
in the hot dog photo captions was not “disparaging” enough to lose Section 7

110
111
34.
112
113
114
115

Id.
Karl Knauz Motors, Inc. 358 N.L.R.B. N o . 164 (2012); The NLRB and Social Media, supra note
See supra text accompanying notes 16-28.
Karl Knauz Motors, Inc. 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at *1, *10.
Id. at *16.
See supra text accompanying note 17.

116 Karl Knauz Motors, Inc. 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at *16.
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protection.118 However, the NLRB did find that the posts about the car accident were not protected since
they had no connection to terms or conditions of employment, nor did any other employee’s reaction deem
it concerted either.119
Yet, the salesman did bring another claim, which concerned the employer’s social media policy in the
employee handbook.120 The NLRB analyzed whether the policy would reasonably chill employees in the
exercise of their Section 7 rights under Lafayette Park and Lutheran Village.121
It examined the dealership’s Courtesy Rule that read:
(b) Courtesy: Courtesy is the responsibility of every employee. Everyone is expected to be courteous,
polite and friendly to our customers, vendors and suppliers, as well as to their fellow employees. No
one should be disrespectful or use profanity or any other language which injures the image or
reputation of the Dealership.122
The NLRB explained that this rule was too broad, because an employee could reasonably construe
that the disrespectful language c l a u s e could be interpreted to bar any protest or criticisms that could injure
the image of the company.123 The Board only addressed the language of the Courtesy Rule explaining it
could be understood to limit protected rights, but it did not provide any examples of injurious statements
which should be protected and which should not.124
This was the first time the NLRB struck down a social media policy because it was too
broad and could be construed to chill employee’s rights.125
2. Hispanics United of Buffalo
In December 2012, the NLRB issued its’ second significant decision, Hispanics United of Buffalo
(HUB), where the NLRB applied “settled Board law”126 to decide whether the

118
119
120
121
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Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
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Id. at

*17.
*18.
*1-3.

*1.
123 Id.
124 Id. at *1-2.
125 Id. at *1.
126 The NLRB and Social Media, supra note 34. The settled Board law that the NLRB is referring to
is what is described in Part III.A. as the traditional standards.
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employees’ actions were concerted.127 This was also the first Board decision where the NLRB
mandated reinstatement of the employees after a social media firing.128
Here, two employees, who worked in two different departments at HUB, were speaking via text
message after work hours.129 During the text message conversation, one of the employees explained she
planned to complain to management about several of the departments because she did not believe they were
performing satisfactorily.130 The other employee on the receiving end of the text message was frustrated,
because she worked in one of the departments her friend planned to complain about.131 Therefore, she posted
on Facebook from her personal home computer writing, “[my fellow employee] feels that we don’t help our
clients enough at [HUB]. I about had it! My fellow coworkers how do u feel?”132 Four other coworkers who
worked in the same department, replied via their personal home computers and objected to the fact that their
coworker from a different department was claiming their work was substandard.133 The employee, who
planned to complain about the other departments, replied to the Facebook posting writing, “stop with your lies
about me.”134
That same employee went to her supervisor, but instead of complaining about the departments like
she had planned, s h e claimed the Facebook posts defamed her.135
Thereafter, the supervisor fired the employee who originally posted the status and also the other four
employees who responded to it.136 The supervisor claimed they were terminated
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because the remarks on Facebook constituted bullying and harassment of a fellow coworker.137
Thus, those five employees brought suit.138
The NLRB concluded under Meyers I and II that the terminated employees were unquestionably
exercising their Section 7 rights.139 The NLRB emphasized that these were clearly concerted actions because
the comments made by the employees on social media were for the “purpose of mutual aid or protection”
which is lawful.140 The NLRB reasoned that the employee, whom initially shared on social media, was only
alerting her fellow coworkers to a complaint about them.141 And, when she shared this on social media,
she not only wanted her coworkers to know how frustrated she was, but also what they thought about the
situation too.142 Therefore, the employees’ responses to the original post were deemed to be in common cause,
thereby making their responses plus the original post concerted action.143 The NLRB concluded this interaction
over social media was evidence of the first step of group action against the other employee, which would
enable them to come together to defend themselves over any consequences of the complaint.144
The NLRB emphasized the purpose for initiating group action does not need to be stated
in the initial communication.145 Instead, the activity between the employees is enough to be concerted.146
Further, since these comments also centered on job activities, they were certainly protected under the
NLRA.147

137 Id.
138 Id. at *1.
139 Id. at *2; see Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B 493, 497 (1984) (explaining the other two elements of the
Meyers I standard).
140 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. 37 at *2.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at *3.
146 Id.
147 Id. at *4.
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The NLRB applied its traditional standards in HUB without taking note that these conversations
took place over social media. Instead, it applied the traditional standards as it would in any other setting.
3. Dish Network Corp.
Dish Network Corp. does not involve an employee terminated for utilizing social media, but instead
involved an employee terminated for multiple safety violations who challenged the employer’s social media
policy f o u n d in the employee handbook.148 The NLRB examined the employer’s social media policies
and held they were unlawful.149
The NLRB specifically looked at a section of the policy that explained the employer regarded social
media as a form of communication, but that only those who were authorized to speak on behalf of the
company may do so through such media.150 The employer also specifically limited employees from
“mak[ing] disparaging or defamatory comments about [the company], its employees, officers, directors,
vendors, customers, partners, affiliates, or our, or their, products/services.”151
Lastly, the policy explained that other than situations where the employee was “specifically authorized” to
use social media, the employee could not use social media on company time or with the company’s
resources.152
The NLRB held these policies were unlawful for two reasons.153 First, it cited Karl Knauz
Motors and explained that an employer’s social media policy cannot limit negative commentary on social
media.154 By relying on Karl Knauz Motors, the Board only applied traditional standards but gave no
reason why it did so.155 Second, it explained that the part of the policy that denied
148 Dish Network Corp., 359 N.L.R.B. 108, at *1, *8 (2013).
149 Id. at *7.
150 Id. (noting the policy included blogs, forums, wikis, and professional networks as forms of social media).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at *8.
154 Id.
155 Meaning the traditional standards, which were applied in Knauz BMW.

	
   	
   	
  

20

the employees ability to participate in negative discussion during company time was improper, because
the employer’s policy did not explain that the employees could still do so on breaks and other nonworking hours.156
4. Design Tech. Grp.,
Design Tech. Grp. is the most recently released Board decision.157 The NLRB found that the
termination was unlawful and ordered reinstatement because the employees were clearly exercising their
Section 7 rights over social media.158 The NLRB relied on Meyers I and II to reach its conclusion, but its
reasoning was less clear in comparison to the Board’s earlier decisions.159
In Design Tech. Grp.,, three sales people, who worked at a clothing store,
had several issues with their store manager.160 Specifically, the issues revolved around closing the store
earlier.161 The sales people wanted earlier closing hours for safety reasons, and they believed the store was
also losing money by staying open later.162 The sales manager disagreed and never delivered the concerns
of the sales people to the higher management.163 However, while the sales manager was on vacation, one of
the sales people had the store’s owner sanction an early closing.164 That same night, the store manager tried
to call the store while it still should have been open.165 There was no answer, which upset the store
manager, so she called the sale peoples’ personal phones to find out why the store was not open.166
156 Id. at *8
157 Design Tech. Grp., 361 N.L.R.B. 79, at *1 (2014).
158 Id. at 1.
159 Id.; see Design Tech. Grp., 2012 WL 1496201, at *1 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 27, 2012) (showing the case the
reasoning that the Board affirmed but delivered a different remedy than the administrative law judge
originally did).
160 Id. at *3.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at *4.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
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One of the sales people explained the store’s owner sanctioned the early closing, but the manager did not
believe her.167 The sales person contacted the store’s owner to inform her of her recent conversation with the
sales manager, and the owner assured her not to worry.168 The sales manager called the sales person again to
explain the store was to continue with its regular hours, a n d that she was also very frustrated t h a t the sales
person spoke with the owner instead of the sales manager about closing earlier.169
The sales person then posted to Facebook about her frustration with
the manager.170 She wrote “[I] need[] a new job. I’m physically and mentally sickened.”171 The other two
sales people replied t h a t they were both frustrated with the sales manager as well, and did not think anyone
was helping the situation.172 One of the sales people also explained her mother was a lawyer at a firm that
specialized in labor law, and that she had looked through a
state’s workers’ rights’ handbook where she noticed there were definitely some violations with
the clothing store’s management.173 She brought the employee rights’ book into work the next day, and the
sales people all looked through it together.174
Another sales employee who was friendlier with the sales manager, informed the sales manager
about the Facebook conversation.175 A few days later, the sales employees, whom had participated in the
Facebook conversation, were all terminated because “things were not working out.”176 One of the sales
people sarcastically posted to her Facebook that she was happy to be fired.177
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The clothing store’s management claimed the sales personnel were fired for a several different
178
reasons.
They claimed that the personnel were fired for other inappropriate conduct that did not involve
the Facebook conversation, including insubordination issues, as well as other workplace issues.179 The sales
people then brought suit.180
The NLRB reasoned under Meyers I and II that these employees were undoubtedly
trying to improve their working conditions and thus were protected by Section 7.181 The NLRB
explained that the employees’ concerns over safety and store profits, which they voiced to their store manager,
were considered to be discussion over working conditions, and therefore protected.182 The NLRB also noted
t h a t bringing in the employee rights’ handbook was clearly protected concerted activity.183 The NLRB
consequently held that the employer’s conduct was unlawful.184 It also demanded reinstatement of the
employees.185
The NLRB provided no other reasoning as to why it applied its traditional standards
from Meyers I and Meyers II to reach its decision.186 Although this was ultimately a good outcome and a clear
example of employees exercising Section 7 rights on social media, it still leaves open much uncertainty. Why
did the NLRB revert back to its traditional standards for social media disputes after creating modified ones?
And accordingly, by providing no explanation a s t o why it reverted b a c k to its traditional standards, how
can an employee or an employer predict what is protected, and what is not over social media? The next section
includes a critique of the NLRB’s methods, as well as a proposal, which would create a bright line distinction
to better balance both employer and employee interests and provide more predictable outcomes for social
media disputes.
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IV.

Critiquing the NLRB’s Approach to Social Media Disputes: A Proposal to
Balance the Interests of Both Employers and Employees

Given the lack of other relevant law governing social media and employment disputes, the NLRB
has served as an important stopgap, offering some guidance to workers and employers in this area. However,
the NLRB’s reasoning does not strike a fair balance between the competing interests of employers and
employees in social media disputes, nor does it provide a consistent or clear enough guide on a crucial issue
of workplace management. Therefore, Section A addresses how the NLRB has not adequately modified
traditional standards to reflect the unique features of social media cases. Section B develops an alternative to
the current approach, enhancing the interests of both sides and providing more notice of when social media
use is protected.
A. Did the NLRB Forget That Social Media is “Inherently Different”?
The NLRB stated in its three memorandums released from 2011-2012 that it hoped to provide some
guidance in this area of the law.187 In the Second Report, the NLRB claimed it recognized the “inherent
difference” between exercising Section 7 rights over social media versus a face-to-face discussion.188
However, in its Board decisions released after the three memorandums,189 the NLRB does not recognize or
mention any differences and instead reverted back to applying its traditional standards to social media disputes
rather than its modified ones.
Additionally, the NLRB does not provide any reasoning why it returned to its traditional
standards, except noting they are long standing precedent. But, applying traditional
187 Solomon, First Report, supra note 84; Solomon, Second Report, supra note 6; Lafe E. Solomon,
Third Report, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD. (May 30, 2012), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/factsheets/nlrb-and-social-media (follow “third report” hyperlink).
188 Solomon, Second Report, supra note 6.
189 See Design Tech. Grp., 361 N.L.R.B 79, at *1; Dish Network Corp., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at *1, *8;
Hispanics
United of Buffalo, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at *1 (2012); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at *1
(2012); Solomon, First Report, supra note 84; Solomon, Second Report, supra note 6; Solomon, Third Report,
supra note 187.
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precedent to such a non-traditional, unique platform seems improper, especially since the NLRB previously
recognized there was a difference.190 The difference accounted for the effects a social media posting about the
workplace may have on third parties. A third party will not usually be exposed to employee workplace issues in
the typical face-to-face situations where the traditional standards apply. Alternatively, when an employee shares
workplace issues over social media, it is more than likely to reach third parties. Moreover, i t i s
i n d u b i t a b l e that social media posts about the workplace may affect a third party’s relationship with that
business. The third party may choose to take its business elsewhere or even influence others to take their
business elsewhere.
The fact that the NLRB did recognize these differences before returning to its
traditional standards, creates uncertainty and a lack of guidance for employers and employees. First, it is
unclear whether the traditional standards or modified standards should apply. And second, even when the
NLRB applies the same t r a d i t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s of Section 7 to a case, it reaches inconsistent results. For
example, compare the truck driver’s story in Part I of this Note, with Karl Knauz Motors, the hot dog story.
The NLRB applied Meyers I and II in each case to reach opposite results.191 With the truck driver, the NLRB
claimed that under Meyers I and II, the driver’s posts were not protected because they did not show intent to
create group action, but in Karl Knauz Motors, under the same standard, the NLRB protected mocking photos
of the hot dog stand because they could have “possibly”192 been concerted.193 Even comparing the truck
driver case with HUB, where the same Meyers I and II standards were applied, the results are still inconsistent.
The truck driver was arguably only complaining about another coworker with his Facebook post, plainly the
person who did not forward the calls properly, where the employees in HUB were complaining about their
fellow
190
191
192
193

	
   	
   	
  

See supra Part III.B.
A d v i c e M e m o r a n d u m , s u p r a n o t e 1 , a t *2; see supra Part IV.C.1.
See supra text accompanying note 117.
Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at *2; see supra text accompanying notes 112-17.

25

coworker who was planning to complain to management about them.194 It is difficult to understand the
NLRB’s rationale behind these t w o different results when there is no explanation provided.
Therefore, the following section will identify important employer and employee interests, and then
propose a more clear and predictable standard t o better serve and balance those competing interests.
B. Employer and Employee Interests: Where Is the Balance?
In order for the NLRB to create a clear and predictable standard, the NLRB must address the
interests of both employers and employees. This is not an easy feat since at times what is good for an
employee may cut hard against what is good for an employer. This section tries to effectuate that balance.
1. Employer Interests
The NLRB barely mentions or even takes into account the impact that employees’ social media use
may have on employers’ interests. Specifically, it can affect the employer’s ability to operate efficiently and
effectively.195 It is doubtless that social media use can affect the workplace considering that nearly half of
office employees access Facebook during work hours.196 Certainly though, the social media issues in this
Note a l s o include the usage outside of the workplace. Therefore, employers also have a right to a “significant
degree of control over employees’ words and actions” because otherwise an employee’s actions could be in
conflict with the operation of the business.197 Consequently, when the NLRB does not mention employers’
interests, it is difficult for an employer to lawfully mitigate the impact o f an employee’s

194 See supra text accompanying notes 3-8, 129-32.
195 See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418-19 (2006) (discussing rights and interests
of an employer).
196 Patricia Sánchez Abril et al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media
Privacy and the Twenty-First Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 106 (2012).
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social media use. Many have tried to create social media policies, but because of the NLRB’s clear lack of
guidance, it makes this especially difficult to do so lawfully.
Thus, employers must be able to create clear social media policies in order to inform employees what
they may share about the workplace. Employers are aware that an employee’s expression on social media can
have an impact on the business. Therefore, the employer has a legitimate interest in what an employee is
sharing.
However, employers do recognize that employees also have a valid interest in their
Section 7 rights, and therefore certain topics may not be limited. Specifically, discussions o v e r a n
e m p l o y e e ’ s t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f e m p l o y m e n t a r e still valid when discussed over social
media. Still, it is hard to decipher w h e n a n e m p l o y e e ’ s social media u s e i s i n v a l i d , such as an
employee voicing a personal gripe,198 or if it is valid, such as an actual discussion over terms and conditions
of employment. Therefore, the NLRB needs to address this ambiguity rather than turn to traditional standards
that do not highlight this difference.
Moreover, while the NLRB has turned to traditional standards to evaluate social
media disputes, it has ignored the legitimate interest that an employer has in a social media discussions of
employment in comparison to face-to-face discussions. The employer has more of a stake in the social media
discussion because it is so easily viewable by the public and others not associated with the business. The
NLRB should consider this and continue to expand and apply the modified standards,199 which accounted
for the impact an employee’s post can have on third parties.
Furthermore, if there is damage to an employer because of an employee’s use of social
media, an employer should have a remedy. At this point, there is no discussion of what recourse the employer
should have if there was damage from an employee’s post. The NLRB should define that recourse.

198 See supra text accompanying note 58.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 115-125.
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Even though employers d o have a valid interest in employees’ social media use, employees also still
have a right to utilize social media.
2. Employee Interests
An employee is entitled to concerted action, but when they are applied to social media, it is tough to
know where to draw the line. For an employee, the decisions released by the Board provide no clear answer as
to what conduct may be protected. Take for example, the truck driver from Part I, whose actions were not
protected when he shared his frustration over Facebook that he would be late for a delivery, in comparison to
the BMW salesman in Karl Knauz Motors, whose actions were protected when he posted mocking photos of a
hot dog stand.200 When comparing the line of reasoning between these two cases, and the lack thereof, it is
difficult for an employee to understand which types of action are protected under Section 7.
An employee’s Section 7 rights and legitimate interests in self-expression and privacy allow social
media use about the workplace. However, this does not mean the NLRB must create a policy that all social
media expression is protected. Such a policy would be too expansive when weighed against employers’
interests. Take for example, another scholar’s argument from 2013, where she asserted that when one
employee shares something about the workplace on social media, and then another employee sees it but does
not respond to it, it should be concerted.201 However, if the NLRB granted that type of policy, it would be
too broad and sweeping of a rationale that would be unfair to employers.
Nevertheless, there is still concern over chilling employees’ Section 7 rights, especially in
terms of an at-will employee coupled with the lack of guidance provided by the NLRB. An
200 See supra text accompanying notes 1-14, 110-23.
201 Rebecca Stang, I Get by with a Little Help from my “Friends”: How the National Labor
Relations Board Misunderstands Social Media, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 621, 642-48 (2013).
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employee has a right to know what can cause termination, which is unclear with the NLRB’s current
decisions. There is also a problem when an employee reigns in conduct because of uncertainty. Therefore, it is
just as important for an employee to understand the NLRB’s standards.
Thus, in order to strike the balance between employer and employee interests for social
media expression, the next section will explain a more appropriate standard to apply.
3. Striking the Balance
The NLRB must adopt a bright line distinction that would better effectuate this intersection between
social media and employment. It needs a standard that creates a plainer distinction between speech covering
third parties and speech covering other employees, managers, employers, or workplace conditions. The
standard acknowledges that both employers and employees need limitations. The distinction also includes
the rationale behind the “damaging” effects that Atlantic Steel set forth. It provides clearer guidance, while
also respecting employer and employee interests.
Section 7 lays out rights, which are deemed concerted and, thus protected. Therefore,
under the NLRA, it is important that an employee be able to discuss wages, safety conditions, length and
amounts of breaks, required uniforms or dress style, or anything else related to working conditions. Likewise,
complaining about an employer or even a fellow employee, is protected under the NLRA and long-standing
precedent, as well.
However, this bright line distinction takes into consideration the impact that an
employee’s expression on social media about the workplace may have on third parties. The standard complies
with the Jefferson Standard and Atlantic Steel, which limit an employee’s expression when trying to
intentionally damage a business. The standard takes seriously that that an employee’s conversations can reach
third parties easily via social media, which could ultimately hurt the employer and the business. Therefore,
this bright-line distinction does not
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protect an employee’s discussion of customers and customer interaction. N or, does it protect an employee
f a l s e l y acting on behalf of the company or in some other representative capacity. 202
For instance, w h e n applying this standard to the truck driver in the introduction, he would have been
protected. The truck driver was only sharing about another employee. He was also not trying to intentionally
damage the business, but instead sharing about his frustrations. It would b e d i f f i c u l t t o s a y t h e t r u c k
d r i v e r ’ s s o c i a l m e d i a u s e could have an impact on third parties and so, consequently, he would be
protected.
Compare this to Karl Knauz Motors with the BMW salesman. The salesman’s hot dog
photos would not be protected. T h e s a l e s m a n w a s p r e t t y c l e a r l y attempting to intentionally hurt the
dealership by posting the mocking photos. Though, the hot dog photos may have grown from concerted actions
related to compensation according to the NLRB,203 under this bright-line distinction that type of argument
would not hold. Usually an act of mocking is meant to hurt somebody or something and therefore, the hot dog
photos would not be protected since they were meant to hurt the business.
Finally, applying this standard to HUB, the result would still be similar to the NLRB’s
decision. The sales people in HUB were by no means trying to hurt the clothing store at any point. Instead, the
employees were dealing with their day-to-day issues with their employer, specifically their manager, not the
business itself. Therefore, their actions would be protected.
By considering the impact a social media expression may have on a business and
balancing it with an employee’s Section 7 rights, this standard better effectuates both party’s values. There is
no doubt that employers and employees have a valid interest in each other’s rights and limits of social media
expression, but the NLRB must do more to balance them. The
202 This is similar to Atlantic Steel and the Jefferson Standard w h e r e b o t h c o n s i d e r an employee’s
actions on the damaging effects to the business.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
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NLRB should revise its current analysis of social media expression and examine the interests of employers
and employees i n o r d e r to balance them more effectively.
V.

Conclusion

This intersection between social media and the workplace is in need of guidance and predictability
from the NLRB. The NLRB has not legitimately balanced the values of employers and employees by applying
the traditional standards to something, which it pointed out, had “inherent differences.” Therefore, this Note
critiques the NLRB’s failure to consider both the employer and employee’s values fairly, and then this Note
pinpointed those values to create a clearer and fairer standard. Finally, as Amy Jo Martin pointed out, “Social
media is changing the way we communicate and the way we are perceived, both positively and negatively,”
and the NLRB needs to take this into account in order to adopt a new approach to social media in the workplace.
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